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Problem
• Fire hazard in oxygen-enriched
environments
— Space Shuttle Main Engine
(SSME) development
Cataldo documents 12 fire events
Biggs documents several
events in first 10 years of SSME
development
''LOX pump explosions are
nightmarish events in rocket
engine development programs"
— Shuttle GOX flow control valve
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Problem
• Fire hazard in oxygen-enriched
environments
— Personnel have perished
— Missions have been lost
— Equipment has been destroyed
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Solution	
•
• Understand hazard and apply knowledge
• Oxygen Compatibility Assessments (OCA)
required NASA-wide
— Performed per NASA-TM-2007-213740,
Guide for Oxygen Compatibility Assessments
on Oxygen Components and Systems
• Available nationwide
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OCA Process
• Determine the worst-case operating conditions
• Assess the flammability of oxygen-wetted
materials
• Evaluate the presence and probability of ignition
mechanisms
• Determine the kindling chain
• Analyze the reaction effect
• Identify the history of use
• Report the results of the analysis
n,.
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Worst-Case Operating Conditions
• Analysis must be done using worst-case
conditions
• Ignition hazards and fire severity increase:
- Oxygen concentration
- Temperatures
- Pressures
- Flow rates
- Contamination level
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Assess Flammability
• If a material is not flammable
- Ignition evaluation simplified
• If a material is flammable
— Can only be used if ignition mechanisms known and
controlled
• Standard test
— Configuration dependent
— Must know final configuration so configurational
effects can be incorporated into analysis
• Test data available
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Evaluate Ignition Mechanisms
• Particle Impact
• Rapid Pressurization
• Flow Friction
• Resonance
• Mechanical Impact
• Galling and Friction
• Fresh Metal exposure
• Static Discharge
• Electrical Arc
• Chemical Reaction
• Explosive Charges
• Personnel Smoking
and Open Flames
• Fragments from
Bursting Vessels
• Lightning
• Welding
• Engine Exhaust
• Fresh Metal Exposure
• Chemical Reaction
• Thermal Runaway
.i
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Evaluate Ignition Mechanisms
• Particle Impact
— Heat generated when small particles strike a material with
sufficient velocity to ignite the particle and/or the material
• Rapid Pressurization
— Heat generated when a gas is rapidly compressed from a low
pressure to a high pressure
• Flow Friction
— Heat generated when oxygen flows across a polymer and
produces erosion, friction, and/or vibration
• Galling and Friction
— Heat generated by the rubbing of two or more parts together
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Evaluate Ignition Mechanisms
• Characteristic elements (Example)
— Galling and Friction — Heat generated by the rubbing of two or
more parts together. The characteristic elements for frictional
ignition are:
• Two or more rubbing surfaces, generally metal-to-metal
• Rapid relative motion
• High loads pressing the rubbing parts together
• If one characteristic element is eliminated or
demonstrated not to be present, then the ignition
mechanism is not possible
• If all are present, then ignition is possible to probable
• If all are strongly present, then ignition is highly probable
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Determine Kindling Chain
• Ability of a fire to propagate and burn through a
component
— Significantly impacts Reaction Effect Assessment
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Assess Reaction Effect
• Effects of a fire on personnel, mission, and
system objectives
— Most severe effect controls analysis
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Identify History of Use	
- C-1 
Component has experienced routine
operation/cycling in similar or more severe
conditions over an extended period of time
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Report Results
• Enables communication to interested parties
• Must contain record of configuration
— Pictures
— Drawings
— Schematics
— Cross-sectional view showing oxygen-wetted
materials
• Provides record of recommendations
• Assists in risk review
• Assists in anomaly resolution
7F--r
Slide 16
Applications of OCA Process
• Over 400 OCAs conducted for ISS, Space
Shuttle, Ground Support Equipment
(GSE), and rocket engine components and
test systems
• Resolution of SSME contamination
anomalies
• Guide to failure analyses
— NK-33 event in Russia
— IPD fuel-rich preburner fire event
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Summary
• Real problem exists
• Real solution available
• Oxygen Compatibility Assessment
— Design and testing
— System integration
— Anomaly resolution
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Future Work
• Web-based OCA tool being deployed
within NASA community
- Eventually to contractor partners
• WSTF available for-
- Standard tests
— Special materials and component tests
— Oxygen compatibility assessments
— Design process assistance
OXYGEN COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT OF COMPONENTS AND SYSTEMS'
Joel M. Stoltzfus
NASA White Sands Test Facility
Las Cruces, New Mexico
Kyle M. Sparks
NASA Test and Evaluation Contract
White Sands Test Facility
Las Cruces, New Mexico
ABSTRACT
Fire hazards are inherent in oxygen systems and a storied history of fires in rocket engine propulsion
components exists. To detect and mitigate these fire hazards requires careful, detailed, and thorough
analyses applied during the design process. The oxygen compatibility assessment (OCA) process
designed by NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) can be used to
determine the presence of fire hazards in oxygen systems and the likelihood of a fire. This process may
be used as both a design guide and during the approval process to ensure proper design features and
material selection. The procedure for performing an OCA is a structured step-by-step process to
determine the most severe operating conditions; assess the flammability of the system materials at the
use conditions; evaluate the presence and efficacy of ignition mechanisms; assess the potential for a fire
to breach the system; and determine the reaction effect (the potential loss of life, mission, and system
functionality as the result of a fire). This process should be performed for each component in a system.
The results of each component assessment, and the overall system assessment, should be recorded in a
report that can be used in the short term to communicate hazards and their mitigation and to aid in
system/component development and, in the long term, to solve anomalies that occur during engine
testing and operation.
INTRODUCTION
During the development of the Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME), liquid and gaseous oxygen related
failures destroyed equipment and hindered development. C. E. Cataldo lists 12 events that occurred in
test facilities and SSME hardware in the late 1970s.' Robert E. Biggs chronicles the first 10 years of the
SSME development and describes high-pressure oxidizer turbopump explosions saying, "LOX pump
explosions are nightmarish events in rocket engine development programs ,' . 2 For example, on
March 24, 1977 a major fire occurred in the general area of the high-pressure oxygen turbopump
(HPOTP) primary liquid oxygen (LOX) seal drain cavity producing a fire that severely damaged the pump
(Figure 1).
Fires in oxygen-enriched environments have occurred through the duration of the U.S. space program
costing human lives, causing mission failure, and destroying costly equipment. In the Apollo 1 (Apollo 204
Command Module) incident, astronauts Chaffee, Grissom, and White perished in a fire in a 16.5 psia,
100% oxygen environment. The Apollo 13 mission failure, which was turned into a great success by the
heroic efforts of all involved, was caused by an electrical arc in a stirring motor switch in a LOX tank. In
1980, a fire occurred in the 6000 psi secondary oxygen pack (SOP) isolation-valve/regulator assembly of
the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU), destroying the suit and backpack and injuring the worker who was
standing next to the suit (Figure 2). No one was in the suit at the time of the fire.
t Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited.
Figure 1. SSME High-Pressure Oxygen Turbopump after fire event.Z
Figure 2. Space Shuttle EMU destroyed in a fire originating
in the SOP isolation-valve/regulator assembly.
Because of the fire hazard in oxygen-enriched atmospheres, especially at elevated pressures, the WSTF
Oxygen Group developed an oxygen compatibility assessment (OCA) process to evaluate the
flammability and vulnerability to ignition of the materials used in the construction of oxygen systems. This
evaluation procedure  has been adopted by NASA, ASTM, and ISO as a standardized analysis procedure
to evaluate the fire hazard in oxygen-enriched environments. It has been successfully employed since the
early 1990s by the WSTF Oxygen Group to evaluate oxygen systems, identify fire hazards, and make
recommendations to avoid fires in oxygen-enriched environments. This paper presents the OCA process
and suggests its application to oxygen systems in rocket engines.
OXYGEN COMPATIBILITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES
The OCA process provides a systematic approach for identifying and addressing the fire hazards in any
oxygen system. The primary goal is to reduce the likelihood of a fire occurring in an oxygen system or
component. The necessity for conducting an OCA is directly tied to minimizing the risk of fire and the
potential effects of a fire on personnel and system. The OCA process may be used as either a design
guide, to aid in the approval process for components and systems, or in the conduct of a failure analysis
to identify the flammability of materials and possible ignition mechanisms. Having a thorough analysis can
also aid in the solution of anomalies that occur during testing or operational use of rocket engine related
oxygen components and systems. The OCA procedure is to:
1. Determine the worst-case operating conditions,
2. Assess the flammability of oxygen-wetted materials,
3. Evaluate the presence and probability of ignition mechanisms;
4. Determine the kindling chain, which is the potential for a fire to breach the system;
5. Analyze the reaction effect, which is the potential loss of life, mission, and system functionality as
the result of a fire;
6. Identify the history of use;
7. Report the results of the analysis.
DETERMINE WORST-CASE OPERATING CONDITIONS
The worst-case operating environment should be determined to facilitate the evaluation of the ignition and
flammability risks for a component or system. Increased oxygen concentration, temperatures, pressures,
flow rates, and contamination can intensify flammability and ignition risks. Therefore, quantifying each of
these conditions is a prerequisite of analyzing a system or component. Reliance on procedural controls to
regulate the conditions within the oxygen systems should be minimized. A failure modes and effects
analysis may be used to determine the worst-case operating conditions. In addition, the analyst should
determine the worst-case cleanliness level of each component.
ASSESS THE MATERIAL FLAMMABILITY
The flammability of the materials of construction should be determined. The configuration of a system or
component significantly influences the ignitability and flammability of the materials of construction. For
instance, metals, including those that normally exhibit high resistance to ignition, are more flammable in
oxygen when they have thin cross-sections (e.g. thin-walled tubing) or when they are finely divided (e.g.
wire mesh or sintered filters). Therefore when assessing flammability, a system flow schematic and a
cross-sectional diagram (e.g. machined cut-away) of each component that shows the configuration and
materials of construction should be used. The flow schematic of the system and cross-sectional diagrams
of each component should be included in the report.
With few exceptions, materials become more flammable in oxygen as pressures increase. This includes
metals, plastics, elastomers, lubricants, and contaminants. In fact, nearly all polymer materials are
flammable in 100 percent oxygen at atmospheric pressure. Several test methods, such as promoted
ignition 4 and oxygen index , s have been developed to determine the relative flammability of metals and
nonmetals. The latest versions of ASTM Manual 36, 6 Standard G63 7 and Standard G94 8 provide test
data for determining material flammability.
Unfortunately, material flammability is affected by many factors and, therefore, absolute flammability
thresholds are difficult to establish without testing the actual use configuration. Much of the OCA process
focuses on the presence and probability of ignition mechanisms.
EVALUATE PRESENCE AND PROBABILITY OF IGNITION MECHANISMS
The presence and relative probability of ignition mechanisms should be determined. An ignition
mechanism is simply a source of heat that under the right conditions can lead to ignition of the materials
of construction or contaminants in a system. The most effective way to analyze the ignition risks in a
system is to methodically analyze the system for known ignition mechanisms (Table 1).
Table 1
nition Mechanisms
Particle Impact Lightning
Rapid Pressurization Explosive Charges
Flow Friction a Personnel Smoking and Open Flames
Resonance Fragments from Bursting Vessels
Mechanical Impact Welding
Galling and Friction Engine Exhaust
Fresh Metal exposure Static Discharge
Electrical Arc Chemical Reaction
Thermal Runaway Other
a Theoretical only: 	 No current test method exists to duplicate flow friction in the
laboratory.
For ignition mechanisms to be effective, certain elements must be present. These characteristic elements
are unique for each ignition mechanism, and each element is necessary for an ignition to occur.
Conversely, if all the characteristic elements are present, ignition is possible. Ignition mechanisms are
rated using the ignition mechanism rating logic in ASTM Manual 36, Table 2. 6 This logic takes into
consideration both the presence of a mechanism's characteristic elements and flammability of materials.
If the flammability of a material is unknown, or the materials of construction have not been selected, then
the material should be considered flammable for the purposes of assessing the ignition mechanisms.
IGNITION MECHANISMS
Particle Impact — Heat generated when small particles strike a material with sufficient velocity to
ignite the particle and/or the material.
Particle impact is a very effective ignition mechanism for metals, but less likely to ignite nonmetals unless
they are very hard. The characteristic elements necessary for ignition by particle impact are:
•	 particles that can be entrained in the flowing oxygen,
•	 gas velocities, typically greater than approximately 30 m/s (100 ft/s); 9 and
• an impact point ranging from 45 degrees to perpendicular to the path of the particle.$l§
Test data show that, in most cases, the particulate must be flammable to produce ignition of the target
material. However, some highly reactive materials, such as aluminum and titanium, can be ignited when
impacted by inert particles.
Data: Particle impact data for metals and nonmetals are located in the latest versions of ASTM
Manual 36 6 and Standard G94. 8 In general, copper and nickel-based alloys are resistant to ignition by
particle impact. Hard polymers have been ignited in particle impact tests, but limited data exist.
Rapid Pressurization — Heat generated when a gas is rapidly compressed from a low pressure to
a high pressure. This ignition mechanism is also known as heat of compression or adiabatic
compression. Rapid pressurization ignition is the most effective igniter of nonmetals, but does not
ignite bulk metals. The characteristic elements for rapid pressurization ignition are:
•	 rapid pressurization, generally occurring in less than 1 s;
• an exposed nonmetal close to the rapidly pressurized dead-end; and
• a pressure ratio that causes the maximum temperature from compression to exceed the
situational auto-ignition temperature of the nonmetal.
The maximum theoretical temperature from compression can be calculated using the following equation:
07-1)
Tf	 Pt	 (1)
T^	 P
Where:
Tf = final temperature (absolute),
Ti = initial temperature (absolute),
Pf = final pressure (absolute),
P; = initial pressure (absolute),
N = ratio of specific heats (1.4 for oxygen).
The actual maximum temperature is inevitably appreciably lower than the maximum theoretical
temperature.
Data: Auto-ignition temperature data for nonmetals are found in the latest versions of ASTM Manual 366
and Standard G63.' Extensive testing in a system consistent with ASTM G74 10 has demonstrated that for
initial upstream pressures less than 275 psia and an initial downstream pressure of ambient or above, the
actual temperature rise (with real heat loss) is too small for ignition to occur.
This was concluded from tests conducted using test fixtures that simulated the configuration of the Space Shuttle Type II MPS
oxygen flow control valve. The Type II test fixtures were fabricated from Inconel 718 with drill points downstream the flow control
orifice similar to the actual valve and with drill points removed. The tests were performed at the same conditions and using the
same particle mixture that ignited and burned the Type II oxygen flow control valve during certification testing. The test conditions
were as follows: 600 K oxygen temperature, 4600 psig oxygen pressure, and 10 mg of a particle mixture consisting of 26 percent
Inconel 718, 29 percent 21-6-9 stainless steel, and 45 percent aluminum 2219 by weight. The Type II Inconel 718 test fixture that
contained the drill point ignited and burned on the second test. The Type II Inconel 718 test fixture in which the drill points were
removed resulting in an impact angle of 45°did not ignite or burn when subjected to 40 tests. [The Space Shuttle flow control
valve was subsequently redesigned.]
§ Benz, F. Summary of Testing on Metals and Alloys in Oxygen at the NASA White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) During the Last 6
Months. In RF/DLPippen*p:D9/14/88:5722, WSTF Metals Work Memo, from David Pippen to Director of Materials and Processes
Laboratory at George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, September 15, 1988.
Flow Friction — Heat generated when oxygen flows across a polymer and produces
erosion, friction, and/or vibration. Flow friction is a theoretical ignition mechanism, but
current theory suggests that the characteristic elements for flow friction ignition include:
• nonmetal exposed to flow; and
• flow that produces a vibration in the nonmetal.
Surfaces of nonmetals that are highly fibrous from being chafed, abraded, eroded, or plastically deformed
may render flow friction heating affects more severe. Although this ignition mechanism is poorly
understood, it has caused a significant number of real-life fires.
Resonance — Acoustic oscillations within resonant cavities that cause rapid temperature
rise. The characteristic elements for resonance ignition include:
a favorable system geometry, which includes a throttling device (e.g. nozzle, orifice,
regulator, or valve) directing a sonic gas jet into a cavity or closed-end tube;
acoustic resonance (often audible) and
flammable materials in the area of the resonance.
The distance between the throttling device and the closed end affects the frequency of acoustic
oscillations in the cavity due to the interference of incident and reflecting sound waves." The distance
also affects the temperature produced in the cavity. Higher harmonic frequencies have been shown to
produce higher system temperatures. The resonant frequency has been shown to be a function of pipe
diameter and pressure ratio.
Flammable materials residing at or near the closed end of the cavity can self-ignite due to the high gas
temperatures produced by resonance heating. Alternatively particulate or debris can vibrate, causing
collisions that generate sufficient heat to self-ignite.
Mechanical Impact — Heat generated due to single or repeated impacts on a material
with sufficient energy to ignite it. Most metals cannot be ignited by mechanical impact,
however, nonmetals are susceptible to ignition by mechanical impact. The characteristic
elements for mechanical impact ignition are:
• a single, large impact or repeated impacts; and
• a nonmetal or reactive metal at the point of impact.
Some components, such as check valves, regulators and relief valves, may become unstable and
"chatter" during use. Chattering can result in multiple impacts in rapid succession on polymer poppets or
seats within these components, creating a mechanical impact ignition hazard. The presence of LOX
(instead of gaseous oxygen) may cause some porous materials to become dramatically more sensitive to
mechanical impact.
Data: Most metals are not susceptible to ignition by mechanical impact. However, data has shown that
aluminum, magnesium, titanium, and lithium-based alloys, as well as some lead-containing solders, can
be ignited by mechanical impact. Mechanical impact ignition data for nonmetals are found in the latest
6versions of ASTM Manual 36 and Standard G63.'
Galling and Friction — Heat generated by the rubbing of two or more parts together. The
characteristic elements for frictional ignition are:
two or more rubbing surfaces, generally metal-to-metal;
rapid relative motion; and
high loads pressing the rubbing parts together.
Data from ASTM Manual 36 6 indicate that metals, not polymers, are most susceptible to ignition by friction
in the frictional heating tests currently available. Research indicates that polymers may also be
susceptible to ignition in certain conditions. Some components, such as check valves, regulators, and
relief valves, may become unstable and "chatter" during use. Chattering can result in rapid oscillation of
the moving parts within these components, creating a frictional ignition hazard.
Data: Frictional heating data for various pairings of materials is located in the latest versions of
ASTM Manual 36 6 and Standard G948
Fresh Metal Exposure — the heat of oxidation released when unoxidized metal is
exposed to an oxidizing atmosphere.
This ignition mechanism usually acts in conjunction with other ignition mechanisms, such as
frictional heating or particle impact, which damage metal surfaces. This ignition mechanism may
also be present with a fracture or tensile failure of an oxygen-wetted pressure vessel. The
characteristic elements for fresh metal exposure ignition are:
metal that oxidizes quickly and has a high heat of formation for its oxides, such as aluminum
and titanium alloys;
destruction or rapid removal of oxide layer, and
configuration that minimizes heat loss.
Static Discharge — Discharge of accumulated static charge with enough energy to ignite the
material receiving the charge. The characteristic elements for static discharge are:
static charge buildup from flow or rubbing accumulated on an electrically isolated surface;
and
•	 discharge point between materials, generally with differing electrical potentials.
Generally, two charged surfaces are not as likely to arc unless one material is conductive. Static
discharge ignition is most likely to occur in dry gas environments.
Electrical Arc — Sufficient electrical current arcing from a power source with enough
energy to ignite the material receiving the arc. The characteristic elements necessary for
ignition by electrical arc are:
an electrical power source;
an arc with sufficient energy to melt or vaporize materials; and
• flammable material exposed to heating from the arc.
Chemical Reaction — A reaction of a combination of chemicals that could release sufficient heat
energy to ignite the surrounding materials.
The characteristic elements for chemical reaction ignition depend on the reactants involved. For
example, some mixtures may be self-igniting while others need an external heat source. In
oxygen-hydrogen mixtures, the ignition energy is so low that it is assumed that energies released
from mixing will ignite the mixture.
Thermal Runaway — some materials, notably certain accumulations of fines, porous
materials, or liquids, may undergo self-sustained reactions that generate heat.
If the rate of heating compared to the rate of dissipation is unfavorable, the material will increase
in temperature. In some cases, a thermal runaway may be attained and later the material may
spontaneously ignite. Ignition and fire may occur after short time periods (seconds or minutes) or
over long time periods (hours, days, or months). In the most extreme cases, the thermal runaway
temperature may be near or below normal room temperature. The characteristic elements for
thermal runaway ignition include:
a material with a high surface-area-to-volume ratio (e.g., dusts, particles, foams, chars, etc.)
that reacts exothermically (e.g. oxidation or decomposition) at temperatures significantly
below its ignition temperature and
an environment that does not adequately dissipate heat (e.g., an insulated or large volume
vessel or an accumulation of fines).
Other—Potential ignition sources to consider should initially include any external heat sources.
Many of the potential sources of heat are self-explanatory and include: lightning, explosive
charges, personnel smoking and open flames, fragments from bursting vessels, welding, and
exhaust from combustion engines.
DETERMINE THE KINDLING CHAIN
The ability of a fire to propagate and burn through a component, i.e., the kindling chain, should be
evaluated. A kindling chain begins when a material is ignited, and the material's heat of combustion is
sufficient to heat and ignite the surrounding materials leading to a burn-through of the component. A burn-
through is considered unlikely when the materials are nonflammable or an unfavorable fire propagation
configuration is present. A burn-through is considered likely when most materials (including the body) are
flammable and a favorable fire propagation configuration is present.
An example of a component with a possible kindling chain could be a manual valve with a polysulfone
seat and a stainless steel stem and body. In this configuration and at high pressures, the seat, stem, and
body are flammable. If the polysulfone seat were ignited (e.g., by flow friction or rapid pressurization),
enough energy could be released to ignite and burn the stem, which could then ignite the body and result
in a burn-through of the manual valve. The analyst should assess the kindling chain based on the
presence of ignition mechanisms and the ability of the materials of construction to contain a fire. If a
component could be breached, a kindling chain is present.
ANALYZE THE REACTION EFFECT
The reaction effect should be determined. The effects of a fire on personnel, mission, and system
objectives are assessed by determining the reaction effect. This value is primarily assigned based on the
presence of a kindling chain and the potential consequences of a fire. The potential consequences of a
fire are based on the extent of fire propagation in the materials that surround the component. Because it
is difficult to conceive all possible fire scenarios resulting in injury, reaction effect ratings are often applied
conservatively, which means the worst-case scenario drives the reaction effect assessment.
IDENTIFY THE HISTORY OF USE
The relevant history of use should be evaluated. The history of use is determined by whether the
component has experienced routine operation/cycling in similar or more severe conditions over an
extended period of time. For example, if an engine component has been used in similar or more severe
conditions over a period of time, then the component may be considered to have a successful history of
use.
REPORT RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
The results of the compatibility assessment should be documented. An OCA can facilitate the
communication and dissemination of the results to interested parties and record the findings for future
reference. The OCA may also recommend changes to design, materials, and procedures in order to
mitigate the fire hazards identified.
A complete and thorough record of information is extremely beneficial in communicating the findings of
the assessment. Whenever possible, references to the data used in determining the various ratings
should be included. Pictures, drawings, and schematics of the component should also be referenced and
included in the final report.
A system-level OCA should contain the compatibility assessment charts and drawings for each
component in the system. A system description and flow schematic should also be included in the final
report.
Once prepared, the report should be reviewed by other analysts to obtain consensus. Comments and
feedback should be considered when finalizing the report.
APPLICATIONS OF OCA PROCESS
WSTF has successfully applied the OCA process to oxygen systems for the Space Shuttle and
International Space Station programs, ground support equipment at KSC and JSC, and test systems at
WSTF and throughout NASA. Over 400 analyses have been performed since the mid-1990s resulting in
recommendations that have significantly improved the ignition and burn resistance of oxygen systems
and hardware. The process has been applied to the J-2X Rocket Engine and the oxygen turbopump seal
test rig in support of Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) (WSTF/MSFC, 2008).'2
In addition, the OCA process has been used to guide the resolution of anomalies that have occurred in
the SSME throughout the space shuttle program. On several occasions, post-flight inspection has
revealed the presence of metal particles and debris in various SSME components. The question was
always raised regarding the possible ignition of the contaminant and propagation of a fire to the
surrounding components. The OCA process was used to identify the vulnerable ignition and burning sites
and to prescribe the data necessary to determine the SSME system vulnerability. In some cases, test
data already existed and in some cases tests were performed to obtain the needed ignition and burn
data. In all cases, once the data were obtained, decisions were made to either fly as is or to take other
appropriate action to mitigate the risks identified by the OCA process.
Finally, the procedure can and has been used to guide failure analyses of oxygen system fires in general,
and for high-pressure turbomachinery, in particular. Using the OCA process as a guide, WSTF has
consulted with Aerojet to investigate a turbopump fire for the NK-33 event occurring in Russia and for a
fire in the fuel-rich, pre-burner LOX diffuser screen in the Air Force Research Laboratory's Integrated
Powerhead Development Program. By using the OCA process to identify flammable materials and
credible ignition mechanisms, analysts can eliminate unlikely ignition scenarios and focus on those for
which all the characteristic elements are present. Often, this process leads to a reasonable understanding
of the possible ignition scenarios.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
There is a real problem with fires in oxygen-enriched atmospheres, specifically, within rocket engine
oxygen systems. An analysis protocol has been developed which, when aggressively applied, will result
in increased fire resistance and fewer destructive fire events. This process, codified as NASA-TM-2007-
213740, Guide for Oxygen Compatibility Assessments on Oxygen Components and Systems, 3 has been
successfully applied to reduce fires in oxygen-enriched environments and as a failure analysis tool during
the investigation of fires.
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